Discussion of "Asset Purchase Rules: How QE Transformed the Bond Market"

Wenhao Li

USC Marshall

UBC Winter Conference 2025

### Motivation and Summary



- Q: Is there a QE policy rule rather than one-time policy intervention?
- Importance: parallel to Taylor rule (Taylor 1993), and fiscal policy rule (Bohn 1998).
- Maybe call it "Haddad-Moreira-Muir" rule? Or "HaMoMu" rule?

### Main Results: Dampened Response of Yield Curve to Debt Expansion

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Slope of the Yield Curve				Excess Bond Returns			
	Pre-2007	Full	Full	Full	Pre-2007	Full	Full	Full
ln(MWDGDP)	$1.24^{***}$	0.53*	$1.10^{***}$	1.25***	$0.11^{***}$	0.07**	0.09**	$0.11^{***}$
	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Post 2008 Dummy			-1.74***	1.25			-0.07	0.34
-			(0.41)	(1.22)			(0.06)	(0.22)
$ln(MWDGDP) \times Post$				-1.95**				-0.28**
				(0.79)				(0.14)
TBill	-0.32***	-0.22***	-0.30***	-0.28***	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Unemp	0.60***	$0.41^{***}$	$0.48^{***}$	0.42***	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00
î	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	227	288	288	288	227	284	284	284
R-squared	0.73	0.54	0.66	0.69	0.09	0.05	0.06	0.09

- Spillovers to MBS, corporate bond. Option prices.
- Evidence from multiple countries.

# Quantification via Vayanos and Vila (2021)

• After introducing QE, long-term yield negatively responds to debt supply.



#### Comments

- The key message is clear and convincing.
  - ► The promise of QE policy in bad time has tremendous effect in the bond market.
- My main comments are about the magnitude of this impact.
  - Historically, without QE, high debt/GDP is always associated with dampened yield curve response, explaining 60% of the response post GFC.
  - ▶ Both fiscal theory and convenience yield demand generate dampening effect with larger debt/GDP.
  - Identification: debt expansion is usually a result of recession, which also leads to lower expectation of future interest rate and flight to safety.
- Exciting broader-picture questions:
  - ► Can QE create infinite amount of nominal fiscal capacity? How to design QE rule?

#### Historical Evidence: A Longer-Horizon Sample



• Data from Cieslak, Li, and Pfluger (2024), Inflation and Treasury Convenience.

Wenhao Li, USC Marshall

#### Historical Evidence: A Longer-Horizon Sample



• Data from Cieslak, Li, and Pfluger (2024), Inflation and Treasury Convenience.

Wenhao Li, USC Marshall

# Does history present similar phenomenon?

	Dependent variable: term spread					
Sample period:	(1) 1920-2023	(2) 1920-1940	(3) 1920-1970	(4) 1970-2000	(5) 1951-2023	
log(DebtToGDP)	0.803*** (0.066)	1.268*** (0.061)	0.391*** (0.057)	5.232*** (0.797)	1.392*** (0.101)	
log(DebtToGDP)* <b>post1930</b>		-1.743*** (0.102)				
log(DebtToGDP)* <b>post1942</b>		. ,	$-1.001^{***}$ (0.086)			
log(DebtToGDP)* <b>post1980</b>				<mark>—6.798***</mark> (0.893)		
log(DebtToGDP)* <b>post2008</b>					-5.095*** (0.625)	
Tbill 3M rate	$egin{array}{c} -0.140^{***} \ (0.011) \end{array}$	$-0.731^{***}$ (0.018)	-0.503*** (0.012)	-0.529*** (0.020)	-0.235*** (0.013)	
Unemployment rate	0.122*** (0.007)	0.040*** (0.004)	0.039*** (0.003)	0.386*** (0.031)	0.477*** (0.018)	
Observations $R^2$	1,245 0.423	240 0.972	600 0.909	348 0.827	873 0.661	
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01					

• Average interaction coef in history is about -3.178, explaining 62% of the -5.095 result.

# High Debt/GDP reduces term spread response to further expansion

• The above analysis reveals that when Debt/GDP becomes higher, the impact of log(Debt/GDP) on term spread becomes smaller.

	Dependent variable: term spread						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
$\log({\sf Debt}/{\sf GDP})$	0.369*** (0.082)	-2.275*** (0.232)			-2.362*** (0.233)	$-2.362^{***}$ (0.233)	
log(Debt/GDP) <sup>2</sup>	. ,	-1.477***			-1.488***	-1.488***	
Debt/GDP		(0.122)	0.175 (0.175)	6.402*** (0.665)	(0.122)	(0.122)	
$(Debt/GDP)^2$			, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	-5.352***			
Tbill 3M rate	-0.175*** (0.013)	$-0.205^{***}$ (0.012)	-0.201*** (0.013)	(0.553) $-0.182^{***}$ (0.013)	$-0.221^{***}$ (0.013)	-0.221*** (0.013)	
Unemployment rate	0.101***	0.073***	0.095***	0.086***	0.079***	0.079***	
Inflation	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008) 2.270*** (0.750)	(0.008) 2.270*** (0.750)	
Observations R <sup>2</sup>	1,245 0.365	1,245 0.432	1,245 0.355	1,245 0.400	1,245 0.436	1,245 0.436	
Note:	Sample peri	od is 1920-2023	3. Statistical s	significance is *	p<0.1; **p<0.	05; ***p<0.01	

### Plausible Stories for the Historical Phenomenon

- A growing investor base with higher debt supply.
  - Larger debt market attracts more demand, as shown by Dos Santos (2025).
- Catching up of short-term interest rate.
  - At high levels of Debt/GDP, we expect higher short-term interest rate in the future due to inflationary pressure, increasing the term spread.
  - Over time (with high level Debt/GDP), the increase of short-term rate realizes, making term spread effect less pronounced.
- Market expectations of future fiscal policies
  - When Debt/GDP is very high, markets might anticipate a more conservative future fiscal policy that dampens the debt expansion.
- Liquidity effect.
  - As Debt/GDP becomes higher, government debt market becomes deeper and more liquid, reducing the impact of future debt issuance on the term spread.

### What about Convenience Yield?

- Convenience yield contributes to  $\left| 1.084 \right| / \left| 5.095 \right| pprox 20\%$  of the main empirical finding
- Consistent with nonlinear relation between convenience yield and Debt/GDP (Krishnamurthy and Li (2023)).

	Dependent variable: AAA-Treasury spread						
Sample period:	(1) 1920-2023	(2) 1920-1940	(3) 1920-1970	(4) 1970-2000	(5) 1951-2023		
$\log(\text{Debt}/\text{GDP})$	-0.397*** (0.028)	-0.792*** (0.047)	-0.723*** (0.030)	-3.008*** (0.430)	$-1.291^{***}$ (0.048)		
log(Debt/GDP)*post1930	<b>、</b>	0.007 (0.068)	~ /	( )	· · ·		
log(Debt/GDP)*post1942			0.622*** (0.038)				
log(Debt/GDP)*post1980				1.198*** (0.422)			
log(Debt/GDP)*post2008					1.084*** (0.135)		
TB3MS	0.005 (0.004)	-0.022** (0.010)	0.035*** (0.006)	-0.077*** (0.007)	-0.021**** (0.005)		
Unrate	0.016*** (0.003)	0.032*** (0.002)	0.025*** (0.002)	0.062*** (0.010)	0.037*** (0.006)		
Observations R <sup>2</sup>	1,245 0.249	240 0.803	600 0.830	348 0.700	873 0.594		
Note:	* * * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01						

# Classic Theories on Government Debt Supply and the Yield Curve

- In classical macroeconomic models, Ricardian equivalence implies that bond yields are not affected by bond supply.
  - Still so in modern New-Keynesian models.
  - Thus, QE is just a side show.
- In the fiscal theory of price level, a higher government debt supply without fiscal backing increases inflation.
  - It is the  $\Delta Debt/Debt$  that matters, not  $\Delta Debt/GDP$  (see also Barro and Bianci (2023)).
  - ► This leads to a weaker effect of Debt/GDP as debt level becomes higher.
- With convenience yield demand, higher debt supply decreases convenience yield and increases Treasury yields.
  - Most demand specifications indicate dampened effects at high debt/GDP level.

#### A Demand-Based Framework with Arbitrageurs

• Consider a two-period version of Vayanos and Vila (2021). Then the equilibrium two-period Treasury log price is



where  $\beta_t$  denotes total long-term debt supply,  $\theta$  is the investor response to supply and  $\theta^{QE}$  is the QE response to supply. Term  $\alpha$  is demand elasticity and  $\gamma$  is arbitrageur risk aversion.

- QE demand effect reduces the sensitivity of long-term yield  $y_t^{(2)}$  to bond supply  $\beta_t$ 
  - The sensitivity also decreases when other investors are more responsive to supply (higher  $\theta$ ) and monetary policy is less volatile (low  $\sigma_r$ ).
  - Higher  $\alpha$  cannot overturn the sign.

### Does Debt Expansion Reduce Long-Term Yield Post-GFC?



- Post 2008, higher Debt/GDP reduces long-term yield.
- According to the simplified model, this happens if  $\theta^{QE} > 1 \theta$ , i.e., Fed soaks up more than the residual supply of debt.
  - This is not the case in the calibration and data.
- Why does the full model generates negative response?
  - Monetary policy rate negatively responds to larger debt supply, leading to lower long-term yields.

### Debt Expansion is Not Exogenous

- Macro variables (GDP gap, inflation, FFR) can explain 70% of variations in long-maturity Treasury supply.
- The negative response of long-term yield to Treasury supply is confounded with macro dynamics.
  - During recessions, flight to liquidity and increased uncertainty increases preference for Treasuries, depressing long-term yield.
  - During recessions, we expect the Fed to lower rates for certain periods, reducing long-term yields via the expectation hypothesis.
  - Recessions also lead to more government spending.
  - > The direct impact of supply on long-term yield is likely dominated by the above confounding effect.
- Need shocks to identify yield curve response to debt supply.
  - Military spending shocks (Choi et al 2024), tax collection shocks (Romer and Romer 2009), primary fiscal surplus shocks (Gomez-Cram, Kung, Lustig 2023) etc.

## Distinguishing Unconditional Expansion v.s. Policy Rule



- Note that in this simple model, an unconditional demand change,  $\theta_0$ , is also effective in changing the equilibrium yield curve.
- To distinguish the QE rule effect, one has to compare an increase of  $\theta_0$  (unconditional QE policy) v.s. a higher  $\theta^{QE}$  (QE rule).
  - ▶ In the paper, the comparison is between  $\theta^{QE} = 0$  (pre GFC) versus  $\theta^{QE} > 0$  (post GFC).

#### Additional Force: Expectation of QE Persistence

Figure 7. Impact of QE Shocks on Treasury Yields.

This figure illustrates how a \$100 billion QE shock on different maturity buckets, either temporary (left panel, increasing latent demand  $u_t$ ) or permanent (right panel, increasing permanent demand  $\theta_0$ ), affects Treasury yields. For dollar values, we use the stationary model unit as described in Section 4.



Source: Jansen, Li, and Schmid (2024)

### Broader Question: How to Design QE Rule?

- Monetary policy rule: response to inflation and unemployment (Taylor 1993).
  - Tradeoff: employment v.s. inflation.
- Fiscal policy rule: primary surplus response to Debt/GDP for sustainable fiscal policy (Bohn 1998).
  - Tradeoff: paying back now v.s. in the future.
- QE rule: response to Debt/GDP, or broader macro aggregates?
  - What is the tradeoff here? Any downside?
  - Does QE have inflationary effect?
  - Does QE distort asset markets? .....

### Broader Question: Slippery Slope of QE?

• Is the Fed balance sheet becoming a political arena?





- Amazing paper that sheds light to an important question.
  - ► Parallel to Taylor rule and fiscal rule.
- Story is convincing. Magnitude is subject to debate.
- Elude to exciting broader questions: how to design the QE rule?